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Embryonic Futures in the United States and Ecuador
When frozen embryos are publically debated in the United States, they are most
often positioned as having two possible future trajectories: (1) as individual humans
and (2) as contributors to stem cell research. Long-term embryo accumulation
threatens both of these futures. An accumulated embryo is stuck in a clinic, held
back from having an individual future or from contributing to science. There are
other kinds of futures, though. For some patients in the United States and Ecuador,
where I conducted ethnographic research, future reckoning involves a vision of
responsibility toward embryos embedded within a specific family. For these patients,
frozen embryo donation to another family or to science constitutes abandonment.
The future at stake is not that of an individual embryo’s life, but a group’s future
who would abandon one of its own. These patients would rather destroy embryos
than freeze them for a future away from their relations. [Ecuador, United States, in
vitro fertilization, future]
Frozen embryos pose several problems in the early-21st-century United States,
among them, the related problems of overaccumulation and the future. These prob-
lems escalated in 2003 when media outlets reported on a survey conducted by
the American Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology that found that there
were over 400,000 embryos frozen in cryopreservation tanks in the United States
(Wade 2003). The news stories implied that there is a problematic (over)abundance
of cryopreserved embryos, a sort of freezing frenzy.1 Since then, media accounts
have used the 400,000 frozen embryos to fuel ongoing national debates about life
and biotechnology, debates that evoke different kinds of futures for these embryos
(Babington 2006; Schorn 2006; Weiss 2003).
The problematic specter of future overaccumulation emerged yet again in late
2008 around the reportage of a Duke University survey of 1,020 patients from
nine IVF clinics around the United States, who were asked about the future of their
frozen embryos left over after IVF cycles (Lyerly et al. 2008). The authors of the
study found that the majority of respondents, 54 percent, said they were very likely
to use their frozen embryos for future attempts at pregnancy; 21 percent said they
were very likely to donate them for research; 7 percent said they were very likely to
donate them to another couple to have children; and 4 percent said they wanted their
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embryos “frozen forever.” Although these respondents imagined various futures for
their embryos, a full 20 percent said they were very likely to want their embryos
discarded. These patients did not want their frozen embryos to come to future
fruition at all, either as individual persons or as stem cells. They wanted them
destroyed, although many specified they wanted this done “compassionately.” The
study authors sympathized with this sentiment toward compassionate destruction
because of their own understanding of embryo excess. They used the word “excess”
seven times and “accumulation” five times to describe frozen embryos, and they
positioned their study as a call “to limit increasing the number of stored embryos”
(Lyerly et al. 2008).
As a long-time observer of assisted reproductive technologies in both the United
Sates and in Latin America, especially Ecuador, I am intrigued with how the Duke
survey poses the problem of specific kinds of frozen embryo futures and the problem
of excess, accumulated embryos. I came across a similar array of responses toward
embryonic futures in the private IVF clinics in Ecuador where I have conducted
ethnographic research since 2000.2 In the short term, some Ecuadorian patients
want their embryos to remain frozen for future attempts. Others want to donate
their frozen embryos to other couples. And as with the U.S. respondents to the Duke
study, a sizable minority of Ecuadorian patients (and practitioners), especially in
the supposedly traditionally Catholic highlands, are more comfortable with embryo
destruction than with accumulation through ongoing cryopreservation or with do-
nation. For these patients, as with the 20 percent of patients in the Duke study,
individual frozen embryos should have no future.
This wish to prevent embryonic futures diverges from more commonly imagined
fates for these microscopic objects. In the United States, when frozen embryos are
discussed and publically debated they are most often positioned as having two
possible future trajectories, (1) as individual humans and (2) as contributors to
stem cell research, understood as benefitting society at large. As I have written
elsewhere, these two trajectories are partially produced through ongoing North
American battles about abortion and euthanasia, what I call “life debates” (Roberts
2007). On the one side of these debates, right-to-life activists, evangelicals, and the
Catholic Church call for the protection of embryos, fetuses, and the brain dead as
innocent, human life. On the other side are pro-choice activists, feminists and right-
to-die proponents, who champion patient autonomy, the individual right to life and
death, and on-demand abortion (Ginsburg 1998; Kaufman 2005; Kaufman and
Morgan 2005). Life frames the terms of these debates. To note William Roseberry,
“life” is “the language of contention,” “a common language or way of talking about
social relationships that sets out the central terms around which and in terms of
which contestation and struggle can occur” (Roseberry 1993:361). The contestation
in this case centers on the life status of liminal entities, like the brain dead. Often
elided are questions about the means of their production, the economic and technical
resources required to sustain them, or their effects on the living.
Frozen embryos are now central to life debates. For many Evangelical Christians,
the production of frozen embryos is left mostly unquestioned, but their disposal
is problematic. Frozen embryos are “life.” They should be brought to fruition
as individual humans in the future—they should be donated to other families, a
trajectory called for by right-to-life activists and conservative, free market politicians
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like President George Bush. The Catholic Church is one of the few institutions that
does criticize the production of frozen embryos. According to the Church, frozen
embryos should not be produced at all—IVF is a “gravely evil act” because the
process produces, then destroys, embryos. In other words, IVF is akin to abortion
(Ratzinger 1987). In addition “The horror of spare embryos” has been deemed an
affront to human dignity, “an abusive situation against those lives, which can be
compared to therapeutic cruelty” (Zenit 2003).3 Now however there are debates
within the church about what should be done with these embryos. Some Catholic
ethicists call for embryo donation for adoption despite their problematic creation
(Zenit 2003).
Other participants in the life debates situate frozen embryos as “not life” and,
for them, frozen embryos can be donated “to science,” used in biotechnological
research for a better societal future, and, not incidentally, wealth creation. As a
participant in the Duke study, Jacqueline Betancourt explained why she donated
her frozen embryos “to science,” “We were just comfortable with the idea that they
weren’t going to be destroyed. We didn’t see the point in destroying something that
could be useful to science, to other people, to helping other people” (Grady 2008).
Either way, “life” or “not life,” something should be done with these entities. They
should be allowed a future as an individual, or they should become scientifically
and economically productive. They should not remain inert. Other kinds of futures
or nonfutures become harder to think, then, within the contentious language of life
debates in the United States, debates that have gone global to varying degrees.
There are other kinds of futures, though. In this article I analyze both U.S. media
accounts of the 400,000 frozen embryos, and the Duke study, in juxtaposition
with my ethnographic work in Ecuador to describe futures not fully shaped within
the life debates that can seem so all encompassing. My ethnographic research in
Ecuador suggests how to understand why some patients and practitioners in the
United States want their embryos to have no future. For some IVF patients and
practitioners in both nations, future reckoning involves a vision of relatededness
and responsibility toward existing families and to the embryos that could become
embedded within those families. The donation of frozen embryos to another family
or to science, then, would constitute abandonment. Instead of “live” embryos, these
patients have “related” embryos. Related embryos in the United States and Ecuador
are not exactly the same however. In the United States, related embryos still tend
to be individuals, although not autonomous individuals. In Ecuador, however, for
participants with related embryos, the future at stake is not as much that of a related
individual but the future of the group that would irresponsibly allow a family
member to leave its bounds. For both Americans and Ecuadorians with related
embryos, destruction is preferable to the external circulation of future individuals
or the endlessly generative future potential of stem cells. And in both cases the
patients and practitioners who destroy embryos withdraw at least temporarily from
life debates and the bioscientific economies that produce them.
Frozen Embryos
Embryos have a history and a politics in each of the nations where they are produced
in vitro. The embryo in North America and Europe has become synonymous with
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early human life, partly because of the emergence of IVF itself. Currently in the
United States embryos invoke human “life” in the popular and scientific imagination
(Franklin and Roberts 2001), with recent controversies about stem cell research
making that connection stronger (George and Tollefsen 2008; Herold 2006). This
link allows IVF practitioners and patients to envision these externally manipulated
cells as “babies,” which is important given that the take-home baby rate with IVF
is a relatively low 30 percent.
The embryo was not always caught up in life debates, though. Out of body, or
in vitro, human embryos have been circulated in the United States along scientific
pathways since the late 19th century and early 20th century during the formation
of professional embryology. The majority, however, have been embryos expelled or
extracted from women’s bodies that were not understood within the framework of
life or death (Morgan 2009). During this early period of embryology, the border
zone between embryo and fetus remained indistinct, and embryos were made to
speak to debates concerning race and the human–nonhuman divide, not to the
question of life’s beginnings as they are today (Morgan 2009). The development
of in vitro fertilization in the 1970s produced a new object, the live, out-of-body
embryo. The subsequent development of embryo cryopreservation in the 1980s
allowed for the suspension and storage of these in vitro embryos. The fact that
embryos can be frozen allows for their controlled future circulation. They cannot
be legally sold anywhere, but their life potential can be activated if transplanted,
and they can generate “transcendent value,” for the nation or for humanity if they
are used in stem cell research, which involves hopes of future profit as well (Franklin
2006).
Cryopreservation is used most commonly to harness, move, and store embryos
left over after embryo transfer during an IVF cycle. Technically, IVF practitioners
can extract anywhere from 1 to 40 eggs from a woman’s follicles in a single cycle.
These eggs are combined with sperm in a Petri dish in the hopes of fertilization. Not
all of the eggs will fertilize, but often there are more embryos than can be transferred
back into a patient’s womb. With the right equipment and infrastructure, clinics can
freeze these embryos, a process that takes about three to four hours. The biologist
first gradually brings the embryos to a low temperature with liquid nitrogen. When
the embryos are cold enough, the biologist puts the embryos in pipettes that are then
stored in liquid nitrogen tanks, which can usually hold more than 20,000 embryos
each. Fees for embryo storage vary by clinic, region, and nation, reflecting the cost
of the tanks, liquid nitrogen, and monitoring, including alarms, tracking systems,
and bookkeeping.
The what of what is frozen can also vary. The term embryo has, since the first
half of the 20th century, generally meant the period between conception and eight
weeks of gestation; however, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology
(ACOG) currently uses the term pre-embryo in defining the early fertilized mass of
cells. ACOG calls the one-celled entity formed at fertilization, a “zygote.” From
day 2 to day 15, the mass is called a “pre-embryo,” divided into the stages of
blastomere, morula, and blastocyst. After implantation, at day 15 or 16, when
differentiation has passed the point of twinning, the cell mass is then called an
“embryo” (ACOG 2004). ACOG’s definitions of these multicelled masses do not
prevent most of those involved in the IVF industry in the United States and Europe,
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as well as elsewhere, from using the term embryo for any cell mass after fertilization.
Thus, cryopreservation, which often takes place when the mass has reached 4 to
8 cells on day two or three, is generally understood as the freezing of embryos, not
pre-embryos.
In many Western European nations, embryos are produced, stored, and circu-
lated along well-documented legal and ethical pathways that are publically discussed
and regulated. This has not been the case in the United Stated where the federal
government has never sponsored a single grant for IVF research, and there are no
federal regulations that directly pertain to the production and care of embryos in
IVF clinics. In the early days of IVF, the late 1970s through 1980s, life debates
about abortion and euthanasia effectively prevented the federal government from
recognizing or regulating the industry, which ultimately allowed for the rapid ex-
pansion of the private, unregulated IVF industry (Marantz Henig 2003). Decades
later, extra embryos, new objects created through the ubiquity of IVF, have become
another actor in life debates that promise to keep research on embryonic stem cells
in the private sector, less regulated than in nations like England and France.
The George W. Bush administration stood firmly on the prolife side of the life
debates. His administration also supported “unregulated” markets. One of Bush’s
signature acts was to restrict federal funding to the research labs that used one of
65 already existent stem cell lines, ensuring “an enormous captive market for the
handful of companies holding patents on viable stem cell lines” (Cooper 2008). The
life debates that limited federal funding for stem cell research allowed laboratories
without federal funding to use newly produced embryos for research and remain
completely unregulated. In addition, the 2001 “legislative maneuver” (Cooper 2008)
that extended patent law to stem cells facilitated the biotechnology revolution and
directly encouraged embryo production within IVF clinics.
Although the Catholic Church consistently condemns IVF and the cryopreser-
vation of embryos as against the dignity of their humanity, neither George Bush,
nor right-to-life groups, called for the end of the enormously successful IVF indus-
try and all it generates, including the extra embryos that provision the expansion
of stem cell research capitalization. Instead, Bush supported “embryo adoption”
from IVF clinics, what right-to-life groups in the United States call “orphanages,”
a strategy that simultaneously “protects” the life of the embryos and promotes the
“free market” by leaving the IVF industry unregulated. This approach clearly di-
verges from Vatican policy but is in line with the economic rationality of many
conservative Christians. Within this logic, stem cell research can have a regenerative
future in the unregulated private sector, and frozen embryos can have a future life
in the homes of individual, private, nuclear families. This stratagem, made possi-
ble by cryopreservation technology, allows for both the creation and protection of
life and wealth.
Live Futures
Regardless of their position in the life debates, most North American and Western
European IVF participants and commentators tend to assume that the transfer of an
embryo to a woman’s uterus activates the possibility of an individual. Campaigns for
the protection of frozen embryonic life focus on individual embryo futures, a focus
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that promotes their movement into nuclear families who want individual children.
When President George W. Bush held a press conference in 2005 surrounded by
children born from frozen embryo adoption, he emphasized embryo individuality by
proclaiming “the children here today remind us that there is no such thing as a spare
embryo. Every embryo is unique and genetically complete (Stolberg 2005). Social
scientists of biotechnologies, especially of Western Europe and North America,
make similar assumptions about the future individuality of embryos even if they do
not agree with Bush’s prolife politics. For instance the sociologist Melinda Cooper
argues that “the whole point of reproductive medicine is to culture the fertilized
egg cell to term—in other words to actualize its biological promise in the form of
the future individual organism” (Cooper 2008; emphasis added). On either side
of the life debate transferred embryos are assumed to be future individuals. The
individuality of the embryonic life is its most salient feature. I found this presumption
of individuality among many IVF practitioners and patients in Ecuador as well.
The first IVF clinics in Ecuador opened in the early 1990s. By 2002, there were
nine active IVF clinics in Ecuador with more in the planning stages (a relatively high
number for an extremely poor and rural nation of less than 12 million). In total,
these nine clinics, all located in Quito and Guayaquil, Ecuador’s two largest cities,
conducted a total of roughly 350 to 400 IVF cycles a year. Throughout 2002–03,
the period of my most intensive field research, the cost of an IVF cycle in Ecuador
ran from $3,000 to $5,000 depending on the clinic, while in the United States the
average cycle costs from $10,000 to $15,000, a difference that stems primarily from
lower labor costs. Still, though, IVF is more expensive for Ecuadorians. The costs are
relatively higher than in the United States, given average income and cost of living.
When I began my research in Ecuador then, I assumed that I would encounter only
middle- to upper-class patients in the clinics, similar to the United States where IVF is
not covered by insurance. It was a surprise to find that Ecuadorian IVF patients were
from more heterogeneous class backgrounds than those I met in my earlier U.S.-
based research on IVF and surrogate motherhood. A sizable minority of Ecuadorian
IVF patients, about 25 percent, were de bajos recursos (of low resources) and made
less than $500 a month. Despite this heterogeneity, Ecuadorian patient approaches
to frozen embryos were less determined by class than by region. How embryos’
futures mattered depended on whether patients were from coastal Guayaquil or
from sierran Quito.
I was also surprised to find that, given the Catholic Church’s condemnation of
IVF, the practice of IVF was in many ways less problematic than in the United States,
where the introduction of technology and other parties to the naturalized, nuclear
family often causes anxiety (Modell 1991; Strathern 2005; Thompson 2005). I even-
tually came to see that IVF was less of a problem in Ecuador, because in both regions,
children are understood as produced through reciprocal material collaboration with
family members, God, and saints. Adding doctors and technological mastery to this
mix of relations enhances a child’s and parents’ relatedness, as well as proclaims
their parents’ ability to seek medical care in the private sector. Not all technological
practice was greeted with the same enthusiasm across regions however. Practitioners
in both regions were proud when they were able to offer cryopreservation. It indi-
cated the advancement of their clinics. But while the technology solved problems for
practitioners in Guayaquil, especially the problem of life, it caused new problems
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for many practitioners in Quito, who were more concerned with the boundaries of
family than with life.
Nearly all patients and practitioners in Guayaquileño clinics, near the coast of
Ecuador, embraced the arrival of cryopreservation in 2002 with great enthusiasm,
primarily because the practice solved the problem of life. The practice was described
as “saving life.” Guayaquil is Ecuador’s largest and most commercial city, with a
specific political and economic history of “free” labor organization that has pro-
duced more liberal practices of personhood, placing an emphasis on individuality
(Clark 1998). Embryos in Guayaquil tend to be conceptualized as individuals whose
future lives should be preserved. Dr. Castillo, a laboratory biologist at an IVF clinic
in Guayaquil, told me how he and other clinic staff had struggled with the Catholic
Church’s condemnation of IVF. Dr. Castillo argued that cryopreservation was the
best way to diffuse the church critique of embryo disposal. His claim ignored the
fact that the Church condemns cryopreservation as well. Dr. Castillo explained,
“I prefer to freeze embryos”: No están en el tacho al menos están en el tanque
[Better in the tank than the dustbin]. This statement, proverblike in its economy
of expression, exemplified the stakes of his anxiety. Freezing preserves embryonic
life. Several years earlier Dr. Castillo’s clinic had begun a frozen embryo donation
program where patients with frozen embryos could pass them on to other patients,
another way to save embryonic life. These embryos were individuals. They were not
tied to a particular family. They could be circulated through embryo donation, and
as Dr. Castillo told me their lives could be “suspended for the future,” as long as
they were preserved.
In my discussion with Dr. Vega, the staff psychologist at Dr. Castillo’s clinic, he
emphasized that suspended temporality did nothing to affect the embryo’s future.
The church experts say it is considered a human life, the new cell, and the
union of sperm with the egg. To avoid this controversy you can say to the
church “look, we are freezing these embryos” and after ten years you can
revive them and they continue being the same being. Nothing is lost.
Nothing.
Dr. Vega emphasized how embryos remain the same being, even over ten years.
The temporal suspension involved in freezing was not problematic because frozen
embryos are live, almost autonomous individuals, not yet part of a family that might
have moved through time without them.
Future life was also important for Eliana and Samuel, a middle-class couple
from Guayaquil who had two-week-old triplets through IVF. Like Dr. Castillo,
cryopreservation offered Eliana and Samuel a scientific way out of the dilemma of
life as posed by the church. They agreed with the church that embryos are life, and
as Samuel explained, “the science continues advancing . . . they, the scientists can
give a future, with freezing, that used to be thrown out.” This couple had undergone
IVF right before the clinic began their cryopreservation program. Their IVF cycle
resulted in six extra embryos, which Eliana wished they had been able to freeze
because of her fear that something could have happened to the triplets in utero or
shortly after birth:
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If the pregnancy fails or if they are born but fail, then there is the option of
the other embryos that are frozen in the machine. I would have done it at
least a year. I read that they can freeze [the embryos] with contracts for a
year. Here are our children. They are frozen for the future.
Eliana and Samuel had wanted to donate their six extra embryos to another
couple, but there were no patients who were physiologically synchronized to receive
the embryos at the time. Freezing would have solved this problem. Dr. Castillo and
Eliana and Samuel were intent on preserving the future lives of individual embryos.
Their most salient characteristics were their individuality and their life. For patients
who already could imagine circulating their embryos outward, cryopreservation
and routine embryo donation represented the potential future of an individual child
saved or insured. As Eliana explained, the embryos are “frozen for the future”
Related Futures
In Quiteño IVF clinics in the highlands of Ecuador, when it came to embryos there
were often other kinds of futures at stake. Quiteño practices of personhood tend
to valorize the specificity of particular familial collectives, which produce related
embryos, rather than individual embryos, as well as emphasize a different future.
Quito is a highland city, historically the seat of colonial government provisioned
through a hierarchal, agrarian peasant economy, based on patron–client relations
instead of the “free” circulation of labor as in Guayaquil (Clark 2002; Larson
2004). Personhood continues to be constituted relationally within family boundaries
(Scrimshaw 1981; Verdesoto et al. 1995). Although many patients and practitioners
welcomed the ability to cryopreserve embryos and save their future lives, others were
much more anxious about the implications of this technology. They tended to want
to throw out extra embryos to prevent the complicated, collective kinship trouble
that frozen or donated embryos might entail. In this case the need to prevent the
circulation of embryos outside of a particular family grouping loomed larger than
the future “life” of an individual embryo. Patients were not sure what doctors would
do with their embryos if they could not come back to reclaim them, explaining they
did not know where the embryos would end up.
I met Vanessa as she was undergoing her first IVF cycle. She ended up having
quadruplets on her third cycle. After her first IVF attempt, her doctors cryopreserved
four of her extra embryos. If she got pregnant, Vanessa planned to donate these
extras to another couple, because they were life and could help another woman.
She didn’t get pregnant, though, and the doctors implanted the four frozen embryos
for her second IVF attempt, which also didn’t work. Even after her quadruplets
were born, on her third attempt, the past existence of those four frozen embryos
continued to preoccupy Vanessa. When she had them implanted and they didn’t
take, her mother told her “It’s for the best. It’s from God I tell you that they are gone.
You were very worried about the babies, the frozen ones.” The fact that she had
considered donating her embryos weighed on Vanessa. She told me if she had done
it, it would have been like “abandoning” her child. “There won’t be other children
that are going to be mine and that someone else could have.” Vanessa was like many
IVF patients and practitioners I met in Quito, who found the clinical practice of
240 Medical Anthropology Quarterly
embryo cryopreservation deeply unsettling. Some rejected embryo cryopreservation
from the outset; others like Vanessa, initially acceded to the process then changed
their minds. For both these kinds of patients it was ultimately preferable to discard
embryos than freeze them, given their concerns about the maintenance of family
boundaries into the future.
Frequently God stepped in to prevent quandaries about related embryos. Several
patients recounted similar experiences in which they had not wanted to freeze
embryos and, fortunately, God blessed them with the amount of embryos that
could be transferred, no more. For these patients, it was cryopreservation that God
wished to avoid, not IVF. Unlike the God of North American Evangelicals, who
cares about preserving individual, future lives, the God of many Catholic, Quiteño
IVF patients cared more about the future of a family’s boundaries. God helped Berta
in protecting her related embryos by making sure there were no extra.
With freezing I would have been left with my living children [she already had
two older children] and my frozen ones there, and in five years the doctor
would have discarded them. And I don’t want to do this again. And I believe
that God facilitated here, because only four embryos formed out of the six
[eggs]. Two didn’t form and they put the four inside me.
Berta’s anxiety about freezing embryos had to do with the temporal suspension
of particular embryos as children, in relation to herself and her living children
moving through time without them. The frozen embryos would not keep pace.
Their separation, produced through temporal suspension, made them a threat to
the existent family. God prevented the temporal trouble of extra embryos.
Some IVF practitioners worried as well about the potential for disconnection
between embryos and their families, couching this disconnect in terms of abandon-
ment. In Dr. Hidalgo’s clinic in Quito, Antonia, the biologist, told me that they
had cryopreserved embryos only 23 times in the three years since they obtained the
cryopreservation equipment. She advocated suave (soft) stimulations by using fewer
ovarian stimulation drugs, so there were fewer embryos to freeze. She also routinely
threw extra embryos in the trash. For Antonia, the desirability of fewer embryos
did not stem from a worry that there is “divine punishment for what we are doing.”
What worried her was “the future of frozen embryos, because the parents here are
frivolous and don’t think about them responsibly.” I asked her, “Why worry about
them at all?” and she told me,
Because the embryos are cells with future potential. They are going to be
children. . . . And for this single reason, [the parents] who make the decision
to freeze them and leave them have to be responsible about what happens to
them.
Freezing embryos was not something Antonia took lightly. Her anxiety about the
procedure arose not from individual embryo death but, instead, from the embryos’
potential future abandonment by patients who had responsibilities to those embryos
as parents. Frozen embryos signaled future related children that might be abandoned
by a family, not current or future individual life that must be preserved.4
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The future of related embryos in the highlands is tied to Ecuador’s long-
standing national whitening project, a 19th- and 20th-century response to what was
understood as the degeneracy of racial mixture between colonial Spanish and native
Indian (de la Cadena 2000; Larson 2004). Although mestizaje is often portrayed as
a celebration of the mixture that made the nation, its underlying message regards
the unquestioned progressive replacement of blacks and Indians and the unques-
tioned desirability of whiteness for the nation (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996). In
Ecuador’s highland IVF clinics this whiteness imperative shaped concerns about
family boundaries, where embryo cryopreservation could lead to problematic mix-
tures. Dora, a Quiteña IVF patient, framed her uneasiness with frozen embryos in
terms of the potential for racial confusion after the time lapse of cryopreservation.
Imagine one year, two years that they maintain them. This gives me a bit of
fear that they should endure all this time. It makes me a little afraid that they
are going to confuse them when they put other embryos in me. Like what
happened with that English woman that had a black child. Remember that?
They say that the clinic confused the embryos. That makes me scared. It
seems like a noble cause to give a hand to other people, to help, but no, I
won’t give them.
As for many Quiteños, for Dora, the temporal suspension of embryos threatened to
breach the racial boundaries of her family, putting its future at peril.5
When patients and practitioners felt obliged to make sure their embryos stayed
within certain racial and family boundaries, the technical practices that make up
cryopreservation presented the potential for child abandonment, exemplified by
Vanessa’s explanation that God preferred the death of embryos to the abandon-
ment of cryopreservation. Anxieties about frozen embryos involved a very specific
temporality. Recall Dr. Vega’s argument that frozen live, individual embryos remain
the same being, even after long-term cryopreservation. In contrast, for patients and
practitioners who cared more about embryonic relations than individual, embryonic
life tended to worry about embryonic suspension through time as threatening dis-
connection from a family. An embryo circulated among strangers or frozen for ten
years looks like abandonment of a family member. For these Ecuadorian patients
and practitioners, embryos are connected to larger families. They exist amid a kin
group with its own history, as well as race and class status to preserve, and for this
reason their individual biographies need to be curtailed.
Some IVF participants in the United States similarly worry about the potential
future of frozen embryos away from their families of origin, although these embryos
are more individual in their relatedness than they are in Quito. North American
press accounts have tended to focus on the potential future life of embryos; there is
evidence in these same accounts of another approach to frozen embryos that also
emphasizes connection to a family and prompts the destruction of embryos’ futures.
After Bush’s call for embryo adoption, the New York Times ran an article entitled
“It’s Not So Easy to Adopt an Embryo” (Belluck 2005). It seems that, despite Bush’s
incitement-to-life and the existence of embryo adoption, few couples in the United
States with frozen embryos actually donate their embryos to other couples, even if
they were initially enthusiastic about the prospect. In the New York Times article,
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couples explained that they are uncomfortable with having their genetic children
raised by someone else, or with the possibility that a child born from donated
embryos might wonder why they were not the embryos chosen to be raised by
their “real” parents.6 Patients in the Duke study voiced a similar concern. Kim Best
had 14-year-old twins through IVF and nine embryos frozen in the clinic where
she underwent her IVF cycle. She explained that the embryos had the potential
to become beautiful people, so donating them for research seemed horrifying to
her. “Destroying them would be preferable” (Grady 2008). Her teenage daughter
thought she should donate them to another couple, but Best could not contemplate
that either because she would not know “what kind of parents they were with
or what kind of life they had.” Her concern was not so much the boundaries of
her family as a whole, but more her responsibility to future individual members of
her family. She did not want her individual embryos to have a future away from her
care or a future in a research lab, precisely because she is related to them.
The Duke study enumerated the discomfort some patients have with embryo
donation. Of the patients they surveyed, 59% did not want to donate their embryos
to other couples—“mostly because they did not want someone else bringing up
their children, or did not want their own children to worry about encountering
an unknown sibling some day.” This future could involve a “some day” when
siblings might unknowingly mix. Like the patients and practitioners I encountered in
highland Ecuador, the Duke authors couched the long-term preservation of embryos
in terms of “abandonment.” In describing patient quandaries in the face of frozen
embryos, the author argued: “In addition to reflecting patients’ burdens, delayed
decisions create difficulties for the providers who are responsible for safe storage or
disposition of apparently abandoned embryos” (Lyerly et al. 2008).
And just as in the Ecuador highlands, “care” of related embryos could entail
destruction. It’s worth quoting at length the Duke author’s summation of how
parental responsibly correlates with embryo destruction.
Few patients in this study were very likely to choose the option of
reproductive donation, despite federal funding in support of reproductive
donation programs and avoidance of the perceived moral pitfalls associated
with embryo destruction. Only 7% of participants indicated that they are
very likely to choose reproductive donation; in contrast 59% were very
unlikely to choose this option. Our data help to explain the reluctance
toward reproductive donation. The principal components analysis captured
a domain that has previously not been measured, which we called “concerns
for embryo, potential fetus, or child.” Eight factors loaded on this domain;
seven were thematically linked as fertility patients’ expressions of “parental”
responsibility—concern about or responsibility for the health or welfare of
the embryo or the child it could become. [Lyerly et al. 2008]
Lyerly and colleagues found that even within the charged atmosphere of North
American life debates, few IVF participants wanted their embryos to become con-
nected to another family. Patients couched their concerns about this possibility in
temporal terms of potential, or becoming. The authors found that
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parental responsibility towards this future individual child, towards its
health and welfare took a somewhat surprising turn, not embryo
preservation, but instead restricting embryo circulation through destruction.
It is interesting that this broadly endorsed domain was negatively associated
with reproductive donation and positively associated with options not
resulting in a child, including thawing and discarding and freezing embryos
indefinitely. These findings highlight the necessity of offering options that
result in embryo destruction, or limiting the numbers of embryos created or
cryopreserved by screening embryos for quality before freezing. Going
forward, public policy discussions about embryo disposition practices
should broaden their scope to incorporate patients’ notions of procreative
responsibility. [Lyerly et al. 2008, emphasis added]
The Duke authors call for recognition of a kind of responsibility that values
familial connection to individual embryos outside the terms of the life debates.
This procreative responsibility entails embryo destruction not the responsibility
to ensure an embryo’s future. The right kind of embryo future is imagined still
as individual, although one that exists in relation to a specific family. Although
highland Ecuadorian IVF participants who worried that the possession of frozen
embryos could call into question the future of a family who would abandon one of
its own to strangers, the North American patients worried about their responsibility
to care for their related individual embryos into the future. In the United States, the
reputed home of rugged individualism, individuals can also be related.
In Ecuador and the United States some of the differences between “individual
embryos” and “related embryos” parallel Marilyn Strathern’s discussion of the
differences between contemporary bourgeois English personhood and personhood
for the Hagen in Papua New Guinea. For many IVF participants in the United
States and for some in Ecuador, both live embryos and related embryos tend to be
individuals like the individual person as described by Strathern for English kinship,
in which a baby is a new person that can exist outside its relations (Strathern
1992b). Life, though, makes these individual embryos more circulatable. They are
not context dependent. These individual embryos could have a future in any home.
For North American IVF patients who have live but related embryos, circulation
is not an appealing option. As in Quito, cryopreservation presents a problem for
the North American patients and practitioners who are more concerned with an
embryo’s place in a family, not its transcendent value as life. Cryopreservation tech-
nology brought with it the possibility that the bounds of a particular family could be
breached through abandonment. For many Quiteño IVF participants embryos are
more embedded within a group than constituted as an individual. These embryos are
not autonomous individuals in the bourgeois sense but one formed by its role and
positionality in a family, as Strathern describes for New Guinea, where “persons
embody their relationship with others” (Strathern 1992a). For these Ecuadorian pa-
tients, cryopreserved embryos were “unfinished business.”7 The trouble with cryop-
reservation is not life or death but the suspension and possible future abandonment
and circulation that calls into question the bounds of a larger family grouping.
IVF seems to have fostered similar anxieties about the related status of frozen
embryos throughout the world. In other words, life debates and the presumption
244 Medical Anthropology Quarterly
of individuality have not come to dominate everywhere, especially in non-Christian
contexts. In some Muslim countries where “the right to life” from conception is
not at issue, it appears that the maintenance of familial boundaries and familial
futures is of great concern. Marcia Inhorn has described the reaction of an Egyptian
Muslim couple confronted with extra embryos after traveling to undergo IVF in a
Los Angeles clinic. Clinic staff gave the couple three options: freezing, destroying,
or donation. The wife explained, “We said, ‘destroy.’ It is our religion.” This cou-
ple feared that donation would “inevitably lead to an immoral and genealogically
bewildering [and possibly incestuous] mixture of relations” (Inhorn 2003). These
couple’s embryos were related instead of alive, and their responsibility entailed
destruction to prevent future incestuous mixture within a larger family (see also
Clarke 2009 and Tremayne 2009 for a similar valuing of relations in reproductive
technology in the Muslim world). The ethnographic record is filled with other sites
where forms of relatedness, kin, and religion are more urgent than individual life in
determining the uses of assisted reproductive technologies. In Israel, issues of Jewish
nationalism and the life of women who birth the nation are prominent in shaping
how IVF participates take up IVF and gamete donation (Birenbaum-Carmeli 2009;
Ivry 2009; Kahn 2000; Nahman 2008; Teman 2010). Anthropologists have also
documented how in Vietnam (Pashigian 2009), India (Bharadwaj 2005), and China
(Handwerker 1995) IVF participants have concerns about relatedness, lineage, and
the nation that loom larger than individual life.
An investment in relatedness more than life might be expected in Jewish, Muslim,
Hindu, Buddhist, and Shinto contexts, but despite Christian calls to life, it’s also
apparent that in the United States and Ecuador, Christianity does not predict an au-
tomatic engagement with life debates either. In Ecuador and the United States there
are many IVF participants whose embryos are related, instead of live. In Ecuador all
of the practitioners and patients I encountered with related embryos were Catholic.8
And although the Duke study did not correlate religion to response about embryo
destruction, we can assume that many of these respondents were Christian, given
that 81 percent of the 1,020 Duke survey respondents were Christian—Protestant
(29 percent), Catholic (24 percent), other Christian (18 percent), and fundamental-
ist (10 percent).9 Apparently, some Christians in both nations have more pressing
concerns about their relations (whether individual or not) than the life status of
liminal beings.
IVF clinics produce surplus embryos that fuel political, social, and economic
debates about the right kind of future. Where life debates are at play, embryos
positioned within them tend to be individuals whose lives should be preserved for the
future or individual organisms with biological potential to harness. Freezing secures
these futures. The capacity to store embryos through time is one of the attributes
that makes cryopreservation so appealing for IVF participants who embryos are live
or can be used as research material that promises a better future. But the future is not
always filled with autonomous individuals. Sometimes what matters is the future
of related individuals or a larger kin group, and in these cases the future of these
relations and the larger family group can be secured through responsible embryo
destruction. For IVF participants in the United States and Ecuador with related
embryos, temporal embryonic suspension is exactly what makes cryopreservation
so disturbing.
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Frozen Assets
Most U.S. media reports assume that our national cache of 400,000 frozen embryos
is inherently troubling, conveying a palpable sense of what Charis Thompson calls a
“crisis of stockpiling” (Thompson 2005). The troubles these embryos bring partially
emerge from the U.S. “life debates” about abortion and euthanasia. Leftover frozen
embryos can produce individual futures and life possibilities if they are “adopted”
or a future of greater social good if they are used in stem cell research—either
autonomous individuals that can be freely moved to another family or entities that
can be put to use within an unregulated “free” market. Long-term preservation
threatens both these futures.
In Ecuador, the patients with related embryos found cryopreservation deeply
troubling and sought to prevent it in the first place or to destroy frozen embryos.
Cryopreservation provided too many opportunities over time for embryos to leave a
particular family. Likewise some practitioners were disturbed by what cryopreserva-
tion could do to specific embryos in relation to specific families. Other practitioners,
mostly gathered on the coast, who championed cryopreservation as a means to save
individual life, had other more “general” concerns about cryopreservation. They
were not concerned with the fate of specific embryos but instead with the long-term
mass accumulation of embryos. In 2003, Dr. Castillo, in Guayaquil, was excited
about his new cryopreservation equipment that could now save embryonic life in
the abstract, not in the particular, but he was also worried about the problem of
too many frozen embryos:
We were all talking the other day about how they are going to accumulate.
We have recently begun [freezing] these embryos. If a patient is pregnant,
then those [frozen] embryos are going to stay here for a year. You have to
see what patients want, afterwards if they don’t want them, then . . .
Dr. Castillo trailed off. Embryos are life. He didn’t want to dispose of them, but
he did not want to accumulate a stockpile of embryos either. Dr. Castillo’s clinic had
recently signed an agreement with an IVF clinic in Miami that would allow them to
send embryos to a cryopreservation bank where they would become available for
donation in the United States. His plan was to encourage couples to make a decision
after a year to donate their frozen embryos to this program. Embryos were future
lives that should be passed on and put to use, not accumulated. Their circulation
outward would give these embryos a future as North American children.
Dr. Lucero, an IVF practitioner in Quito with an entrepreneurial zeal, was even
more unsettled by the fate of embryos suspended in perpetuity. Dr. Lucero was
one of the few Quiteño doctors completely in favor of cryopreservation. He was
also unusual for most Ecuadorians, costal or highland, in that he saw scientific
research as a legitimate future for embryos. According to Dr. Lucero, long-term
cryopreservation could create a bottleneck on the free flow of embryos, which he
compared to storing a bicycle for friend but not being able to use it.
What if you have a bicycle and you left it with me at my house because you
are going to go back to your country. You say to me “I will come back in
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three years. Please guard it. But you can’t use it.” And I have space. But soon
my son grows up and he wants a bicycle and your bicycle is here using my
space. And it’s been five years and you haven’t come back. And I don’t know
anything about you, no telephone number. Nothing. And it’s Christmas and
I give my poor child the bicycle. I believe I did the right thing, because who
knows after all that time. This is what they call ethics in fertility medicine. A
percentage should be dedicated for science, to do things with. To look for
better ways, for couples that have genetic problems. And another percentage
[of frozen embryos] would go to couples who would accept embryos because
the embryos don’t have a genetic burden. I don’t like to hear about throwing
out embryos. It gives me bad dreams. After five years the couple should
decide what they want, for science, for donation or, [he hesitates] maybe, to
throw them out. Many people here say it’s they don’t want to store them.
They would rather have a multiple pregnancy. I will put in three and throw
out one. But this is not good, because you could put in three and guard one
for another interest later.
Dr. Lucero was a proponent of cryopreservation because it allowed embryos to be
circulated for other “interests”—other couples or scientific research, but not for too
long. His bad dreams were more about the general waste of potential life or research
material, not about the destruction of human life. In fact embryo destruction was
ultimately more palatable than suspension in long-term storage.
Lucero’s plans for putting embryos to work reverberate with New Testament
industriousness. His bicycle story was similar to the good servants in Jesus’ Parable
of the Talents. These servants invest their money outward into the world and make a
good return. The wicked servant buries his money in the fields. In essence he freezes
assets.10 Practitioners and patients who might leave embryos frozen forever might
not be wicked, but they thwart exchange by preventing embryos from becoming
new people or from becoming material for the greater public good and the greater
market.11 In Lucero’s schema the destinies of accumulated embryos are even more
threatening than embryos that end up in the trash. Cryopreservation, the temporal
suspension of embryos, allows for the harnessing of that potential, but long-term
suspension puts either future on hold.
Frozen embryo accumulation was also a problem for many patients in the Duke
study, as well as for the study authors. The authors conclude that without consistent
clinical policies concerning frozen embryos
the result is delayed decision making, the accumulation of excess embryos,
and burdens for patients and providers alike . . . To limit increasing numbers
of stored embryos, clinicians and policy makers should work to ensure that
patients have access to a breadth of options, including research, reproductive
donation, and alternative methods of thawing and discarding. [Lyerly et al.
2008]
The authors argue that developing protocols for “considerate” disposal would
“reduce the numbers of embryos in storage and help to advance biomedical science,
but also may facilitate disposition decisions that are morally acceptable to the
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majority of fertility patients” (George and Tollefsen 2008; Lyerly et al. 2008). The
Duke study found that only 4 percent of respondents wanted their embryos “frozen
forever.” Most patients evoked the phrase “frozen forever” to signify their fear of
this particular kind of stalled future.
The author’s call is a plea for circulation or destruction instead of accumulation,
with benefits on two fronts—for the advancement of biomedical science and for
morality. The novelty of the Duke study is that the authors expanded the domain
of morality to include a form of parental care that destroys potential offspring
for those “moved by the particular and intimate sense of responsibility” toward
“allowing their embryos to become children.” In other words, while wanting to
prevent the indeterminate accumulation of frozen embryos the authors could envi-
sion halting circulation through destruction. In effect, no one seems happy about
the long-term cryopreservation of embryos, neither participants with related em-
bryos, nor IVF participants who find cryopreservation beneficial for science or life.
For some, cryopreservation in itself, and the long-term accumulation of a family’s
particular embryos, disturbs related futures. But the “intrinsic” problem of embryo
accumulation is most obviously connected to those who engage embryos in life
debates. An accumulated, suspended embryo is stuck, held back from having an
individual future life or from contributing to a larger societal benefit for the future,
as well as from the generation of wealth.
Coda
The conservative legal theorist Robert P. George and philosopher Christopher
Tollefson begin their much publicized, 2008 manifesto Embryo: A Defense of Hu-
man Life with a biblical evocation of the flood; a story of destruction and new life
(George and Tollefsen 2008). They tell the tale of Noah Benton Markham, “one
of the youngest New Orleans residents to be saved” after Katrina in 2006. At the
moment of his rescue Noah resided in an embryo cryopreservation tank.
Trapped in a flooded hospital in New Orleans, Noah depended upon the
timely work of seven Illinois conservation Police officers, and three
Louisiana State officers who used a flat-bottomed boat to rescue Noah and
take him to safety. [George and Tollefsen 2008]
Although George and Tollefson mention in passing the many New Orleans res-
idents who, “tragically lost their lives during Katrina,” their account ignores the
sickening discrepancies of race and class that determined who was abandoned and
died, and who was saved in New Orleans posthurricane. The resources that went
into first producing then rescuing the future, individual life of the embryo-turned-
Noah were simply not available to the majority of the born, New Orleans’s poor
and black residents. Their futures were less worthy than Noah and the other 1,400
embryos, preserved in Katrina’s wake.
These differently weighted and resourced futures mirror those described by Anne
Lovell (this issue) in the rallying of Charity Hospital Babies to save the city’s pub-
lic hospital where so many of New Orleans’s black and poor babies were born
throughout the 20th century. Post-Katrina, the city shut down the hospital to make
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way for a new research hospital and bioscience corridor. The mainstream press
linked Charity Hospital to dependent welfare mothers and the unworthy indigent,
and it valorized the biotech corridor promoting a vision of certain kinds of worthy
futures, where resources are expended on entities like frozen embryos. In response,
the Charity Hospital Babies demanded that their future be taken into account in
the reconstruction of the city. They put up “resistance against redesigning the city
as white, middle-class space (this issue). Their origins put them at a disadvantage,
though, because as babies born in a charity hospital their lives and their futures
were less resourced than babies who began life as formerly frozen embryos.
In the United States and in Ecuador, IVF participants and participants in life
debates are deeply concerned about embryos. The stakes are high and meaning-
ful (debates about human life, societal benefit, profit, responsibility, and familial
connection) and have material effects. Nevertheless, the effects of life debates and
embryo anxieties obscure other material realities. The media coverage surrounding
the freezing frenzy of these tiny entities primarily addresses specific kinds of people
in both the United States and Ecuador, people with more favored futures. In both
locales frozen embryos are produced in private clinics that are unregulated by state
institutions. If they are brought to human fruition they come into being as privileged
children, not charity hospital babies, and like state of the art biotech facilities, they
“promise” a more worthy future.
Life debates can shut down avenues for thinking differently about why so much
energy and resources are spent on embryos. Looking at other approaches toward
embryos, for instance at the patients who emphasize related futures and responsible
embryo destruction, can provide a way out of the language of life. It’s not that the
IVF participants, who seek embryo destruction, are any more critical of unequal
resource distribution than participants in the life debates. In fact their relational
boundaries can be more closed to the external world or a sense of the “greater
public good” than those involved in life debates. They don’t want their embryos
to interact with strangers. It’s noteworthy, though, that these patients would be
unlikely to send out rescue boats to save the future, individual lives of their embryos.
Their nonparticipation in life debates allows for reflection on the kinds of futures
that the debates themselves promulgate—futures that marshal resources on behalf
of individual unborn embryos or privatized embryo research. The dominant focus
on both trajectories allow little room for the babies and adults who will never
have access to the kinds of future bestowed on these problematic, yet private and
privileged, frozen embryos.
Notes
Acknowledgments. Many thanks to S. Lochlann Jain and Sharon Kaufman for organizing
such a rich and inspiring panel at the SMA meetings at Yale in 2009. I think we were
all delighted by the unexpected connections that emerged as we collectively considered
clinical futures. Then thanks again to Sharon Kaufman for her advice on how to bring
my Ecuadorian material together with U.S. accounts of frozen embryos, and then yet
again for her encouragement and perseverance in getting this article out of me. As always,
Matthew Hull provided a thoughtful and critical read, which this time complemented the
useful comments of the three anonymous reviewers at MAQ. A long time ago Nancy
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Scheper-Hughes pushed me to think more carefully about what embryos mean and the
kinds of resources they require. I remain grateful for her prodding.
1. The media coverage about the survey contrasted the number 400,000 with the frozen
embryo holdings of various European nations, whose IVF industries are regulated by state
ministries (Wade 2003). For example, Britain’s clinics were estimated to have 52,000.Ac-
cording to the press reports, this numerical difference is the by-product of a more strictly
regulated IVF industry in Western Europe, than in the United States. The media accounts
did not mention overall population differences between the United States and countries
in Western Europe that could partially account for differences in the quantity of frozen
embryos. With a population of roughly 300 million in the United States, there is approxi-
mately one frozen embryo for every 750 people. In the United Kingdom, with a population
of 60 million, the ratio is 1 : 1150, and in Spain with a population of 40 million, the ratio
is 1 : 1000, making the absolute differences less stark.
2. In 2002–03, I carried out a year of ethnographic research in seven of Ecuador’s nine
private IVF clinics. My observations mainly took place in the IVF clinics themselves, watch-
ing and talking with practitioners and patients in waiting rooms, laboratories, operating
rooms, and patients recovery rooms. In addition I conducted over 130 formal interviews for
the project with female infertility patients, their male partners, IVF practitioners, physicians,
laboratory biologists, and staff at IVF clinics, egg and sperm donors, surrogate mothers,
local Catholic priests, lawyers, and bioethicists. For an expanded discussion of my findings
see Roberts (2006, 2008, 2009).
3. See Roberts (2006) for an extended discussion of the relationship of embryos to call
for human dignity.
4. Practitioners in both cities would tell me if patients left embryos with them over the
long term without paying; they wouldn’t discard them, but the Quiteño practitioners were
much more uncomfortable with this prospect.
5. Quiteño patient concerns about the potential for uncontrolled embryonic racial mix-
ings mirrored their concerns about egg donation. When doctors recommended egg do-
nation, patients in the sierra tended to want to use known familial donors because they
were worried about the provenence of the donor. Patients in Guayaquil were much more
comfortable with paid anonymous donation (Roberts 2008).
6. The Times did not mention that the Federal Food and Drug administration made it
difficult to donate embryos before its requirement for extensive testing of gamete providers
was established (Lyerly et al. 2008).
7. Thanks to Gay Becker for this term.
8. See (Roberts 2010) for further discussion of the complexity of Catholic practice in
Ecuador.
9. The rest of the respondents gave their religion as Muslim (1 percent), Jewish (4
percent), other (5 percent), and none (17 percent).
10. For an alternate analysis of the parable of the talents see Herzog (1994). He argues
that by burying his money the “wicked” servant is actually preventing his master from
colleting interest on his labor.
11. Local “life” rhetoric in Latin America surrounding embryos is entangled with global
debates around “free trade,” which are especially heated in the Andes. Concerns about
free circulation and free trade deepened during my periods of concentrated fieldwork as
Ecuadorians were intensively following the ALCA talks and anti-ALCA demonstrations
that shut down the cities. Patients I met were directly affected by these policy changes
when, for instance, they had their livelihood wiped out by the opening of the Ecuadorian
textile market to China.
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